This study examines the separate impact and joint effect of financial constraints and financial market mispricing on the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows. Using a large sample of US manufacturing firms over the period 1971-2004, we find that financially unconstrained firms are more flexible in adjusting their sources of financing for corporate investment in response to financial market mispricing. Specifically, financially unconstrained firms tend to have lower (higher) investment-cash flow sensitivities in situations of overvaluation (undervaluation). This provides an explanation of why unconstrained firms have higher valuations than constrained firms.
I.

Introduction
In this study, we provide new evidence on how the financially unconstrained firms can utilize their financial flexibility to adjust their sources of financing for corporate investment in response to financial market mispricing. Our unique angle on this question involves investigating the mix of conditioning forces that financial constraints and firm mispricing jointly might bring to bear on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. The interaction of financial constraints, mispricing and corporate investment is new and novel.
It offers important insights into these related literatures, and represents a synergistic bridging of complementary ideas.
A firm is classified as financially constrained if its cost of external funds well exceeds its cost of internal funds (Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ). The pioneering work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) documents that firms facing tighter financial constraints rely more on internal funds for financing investments. In other words, a more financially constrained firm will have stronger investment-cash flow sensitivity. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) challenge the generality of the conclusion made by Fazzari et al. (1988) . They provide contrary evidence, suggesting that firms with easier access to external funds rely more on internal funds for financing investments. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) claim that managers in financially constrained firms may be overly risk-averse in their investment decisions so that the level of investment becomes less sensitive to the availability of internal funds.
In another stream of literature, corporate investment has been studied in the context of stock market mispricing. The theoretical model of Stein (1996) shows that a firm will not invest (will issue equity and invest) if its stock price is below (above) its fundamental value. Recent studies support Stein's hypothesis. For example, Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) find that mispricing does have a strong influence on the investment of equity-dependent firms in the US market. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock price overvaluations lead to more investment in the form of mergers in the U.S. market.
As stated above, our main contribution to the literature is to explore the interaction of financial constraints, mispricing and corporate investment. The key idea is that financially unconstrained firms have easier access to external capital markets. They can easily adjust their sources of financing for investment which leads to greater financial flexibility. In the periods of overvaluation (undervaluation), external funds are cheaper (more costly), investment of unconstrained firms would be less (more) dependent on internal funds. Thus, financially unconstrained firms should display lower (higher) investment-cash flow sensitivity over the periods of overvaluation (undervaluation).
Conversely, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) , the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection problems hamper the ability of constrained firms to raise external funds. Accordingly, in comparing to financially unconstrained firms, investment of constrained firms would be more dependent on internal cash flow even in the periods of overvaluation. In other words, constrained firms are financially less flexible to react to mispricing.
Investigation of the joint impact of financial constraints and mispricing on corporate investment policy is of fundamental concern. Motivated by previous studies in the literature suggesting that financially constrained firms tend to have lower values than unconstrained firms (Bhandari, 1988; Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1992; and Shumway, 1996) , we suggest that the higher values of unconstrained firms can be attributed to their higher levels of financial flexibility. Intuitively, if unconstrained firms do utilize their financial flexibility in corporate investment decisions, they can switch between external and internal financing when whichever is cheaper. Thus, the financial flexibility can lower the cost of capital and increase firms' value.
In the first part of our analysis, the impact of financial constraints on investmentcash flow sensitivity is re-examined. This is done by using a large diversified sample of 2116 US manufacturing firms over the period , collectively providing over 40,000 observations. Firms are partitioned into financially constrained and unconstrained groups based on four classification schemes, namely: dividend payout ratio, book value of total assets (BVTA), the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) and the WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006) . The regression results favor the arguments of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) over Fazzari et al. (1988) . That is, we find financially unconstrained firms display higher investment-cash flow sensitivities than do financially constrained firms.
In the second part of our analysis, the level of mispricing of firms is measured by composite share issuance (CSI) and discretionary accruals (DACCR). The impact of mispricing on investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms with different levels of financial constraint is examined. Consistent with predictions, we find that financially unconstrained firms can more flexibly adjust their sources of financing for investment in response to financial market mispricing. The investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially unconstrained firms is lower (higher) in a period of overvaluation (undervaluation). In contrast, our results suggest that financially constrained firms do not adjust their sources of financing for investment in response to financial market mispricing.
The investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially constrained firms is statistically indifferent during the overvaluation and undervaluation periods. These results are closely related, in spirit, to the findings of Korajczyk and Levy (2003) who document that macroeconomic conditions have less impact for issue choice for financially constrained firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review, motivations and the proposed hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the empirical design, including details of the data and sample. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with a summary and practical implications.
II.
Brief Literature Review
A. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that conflicts of interest and costly monitoring of managerial actions may induce external fund providers to charge a higher rate of return to compensate the monitoring costs and the potential moral hazard problems. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that adverse selection problems may lead to a gap between internal and external funds. The difference in the effective relative cost of internal and external funds makes the availability of internal funds relevant to corporate investment decisions. Fazzari et al. (1988) first established the relation between corporate investment and the availability of internal cash flow -the investment-cash flow sensitivity. They argue that financial constraints hamper firm's ability to obtain external funds for corporate investment so that a financially constrained firm should rely more on internal funds for corporate investment. Classifying high (low) dividend payout firms as financially unconstrained (constrained), they document that financially constrained firms give rise to stronger investment-cash flow sensitivities. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) re-examine the relationship using the same sample of Fazzari et al. (1988) . Cleary (1999 Cleary ( , 2004 argue that financially constrained firms display lower investment-cash flow sensitivities because they are devoted to accumulating financial slack which provides long-term value as suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) . Moyen (2004) provides two theoretical models (unconstrained and constrained models) which reconcile the conflicting empirical evidences of Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . Using the unconstrained model he provides simulated 1 However, Whited and Wu (2006) claim that there are several defects in the KZ index and, as such, it fails to capture the financial status of firms. Therefore, they construct a new index, namely the WW index. Details of the financial constraint measures are discussed in the next section.
2 Cleary (2004) documents positive and significant investment-cash flow sensitivities in the U.K., as well as in France, Germany, Canada, U.S. and Japan.
results which are consistent with Fazzari et al. (1988) , whereas the result of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is obtained using the constrained model.
3
Whilst most theoretical and empirical works document the positive relationship between investment and internal cash flow, Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) show that the relationship between investment and internal cash flow is U-shaped. In particular, the relationship between investment and internal cash flow is negative for extremely low (perhaps negative) level of internal funds.
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B. Investment and Mispricing
A large body of literature has suggested that mispricing, an outcome of investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage, affects corporate decisions. 5 Baker and Wurgler (2002) document that firm will take advantage from equity issuance when its stock is overvalued and repurchase its shares when its stock is undervalued.
Mispricing also affects corporate investment policy. The theoretical model of Stein (1996) suggests that the impact of mispricing on investment decisions is greater in equity-dependent firms. Equity-dependent firms are characterized by low cash holdings and low debt capacity. Thus, overvalued firms have no alternative but to fund their investment through equity issuance. In contrast, undervalued firms tend to underinvest rather than issuing undervalued shares.
3 Bushman, Smith and Zhang (2005) challenge the results documented by previous studies in the literature. They claim that the previously established relation between corporate investment and internal cash flow actually represents the relation between corporate investment and working capital accruals. 4 Other cross-sectional patterns on investment-cash flow sensitivity are also examined in the literature. Alti (2003) documents that investment of all firms are sensitive to cash flow and the sensitivities are higher for firms that are small and young, with high growth potential and low dividend payout ratios. Hovakimian (2006) finds that there are significant differences between firms with different levels of investment-cash flow sensitivity in the US, and that investment-cash flow sensitivities are non-monotonic to firm characteristics (such as financial constraints and growth opportunities). 5 Readers are referred to Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2006) for a comprehensive review.
Stein's result is supported by Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) who examine the relationship using several proxies for mispricing. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also support the view of Stein (1996) , as they show that overvaluation leads to higher level of investment in the form of mergers and acquisitions. Polk and Sapienza (2004) have developed a theoretical model suggesting that overvalued (undervalued) firms tend to overinvest (underinvest). In their model, they assume that market valuation of new investment projects depends on the current market value of the firm. Therefore, to maximize shareholders' wealth, overvalued firms tend to accept projects with negative net present value, while undervalued firms tend to reject projects with positive net present value. Schaller (2001, 2004) , Panageas (2003) , and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005) also examine the relationship between mispricing and investment.
They all find that investment is affected by mispricing. In particular, using US data, Gilchrist et al. (2005) document evidence suggesting that dispersion of investor opinion leads to overvaluation of stock. As a result, firms tend to exploit mispricing by equity issuance, leading to an increase in real investment. However, Chirinko and Schaller (2001) claim that previous studies on the relation between investment and mispricing based on the US market tend to be less volatile than other stock markets. As a consequence, the impact of bubbles on investment is underestimated. 6 They provide evidence that mispricing does have a strong impact on corporate investment in Japan, in that bubbles increased investment by 6-9% in 1987-1989, amounting to approximately 1-2% of GDP.
III.
Empirical Framework
A. Proxies for Financial Constraints
To test the impact of financial constraints on investment policy, it is essential to classify firms into constrained and unconstrained categories based on reliable measures of the financing frictions faced by them. The level of financial constraints confronting firms greatly depends on the extent of the cost differential between external and internal funding. Our empirical analysis employs four proxies of financial constraints, namely: (a) dividend payout ratio (Fazzari et al. (1988) ); (b) book value of total assets (Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Almeida et al. (2004) ); (c) the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (Almeida et al. (2004) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2005) 
The KZ index is higher for more constrained firms and lower for less constrained firms.
Firms falling within the top (bottom) two deciles of the KZ index score are classified as financially constrained (unconstrained).
WW Index. While the KZ index has been widely used in the literature, Almeida et al. (2004) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2005) suggest that results based on the KZ index are inconsistent with counterparts based on other financial constraint measures. To address this issue, an alternative financial constraint measure, the WW index, is employed due to its likely superiority.
Instead of using traditional tests for financial constraints based on regressions of
Tobin Q and cash flow as in Fazzari et al. (1988) , the Whited and Wu (2006) index is constructed based on a structural model which avoids the measurement errors associated 7 Firms in the middle six deciles are omitted.
with Tobin Q in traditional tests.
8 Indeed, the WW index excludes Tobin Q as a variableinstead, it incorporates six variables which likely affect the financial status of firms: ratio of cash flow to total assets (CashFlow); dividend dummy variable (DIV); total debt to total assets ratio (Leverage); natural log of total assets (Size); three-digit industry sales growth (ISG); and sales growth (SG):
The WW index is higher for more constrained firms and lower for less unconstrained firms. Similar to the KZ index analysis above, firms falling within the top (bottom) two deciles of the WW index score are classified as financially constrained (unconstrained). Whited and Wu (2006) claim that their index performs better than the KZ index for at least three reasons. First, the coefficient estimates of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are based on an analysis of only 49 firms from 1970 to 1984 utilized in Fazzari et al. (1988) . As such, the KZ index may not fully capture the financial status of firms in a larger and more comprehensive sample and over a different time period. Second, the KZ index includes Tobin Q as one of the variables which contains significant measurement error. Third, firms which are classified as constrained by the WW (KZ) index tend to be small (large), underinvested (overinvested) and have unrated (above average rated) bonds.
B. Proxies for Mispricing
Discretionary Accruals. Accruals are the difference between a firm's accounting earnings and its underlying cash flows. Following Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) and Polk and Sapienza (2004) , accruals are decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals (DACCR) are the unusual part of accruals open to managerial manipulation, whereas non-discretionary accruals (NDACCR) are the usual part of the accruals that measure the normal business conditions of firms. Teoh et al. (1998) and Sloan (1996) find that IPO firms with higher discretionary accruals tend to have lower subsequent returns than firms with lower discretionary accruals, suggesting that the former are overvalued. More recently, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) also examine the relation between discretionary accruals and stock returns. Consistent with Teoh et al. (1998) and Sloan (1996) , they find that firms with high (low) discretionary accruals will have lower (higher) subsequent returns. This evidence suggests that discretionary accruals is a good proxy for mispricing.
Current accruals (ACCR) are calculated as follows:
where NCCA: non-cash current assets; CL: current liabilities; DEBT: debt and DEPN:
depreciation and amortization.
Non-discretionary accruals are calculated as follows. First, normal accruals are estimated for each firm. It is required that a firm has at least ten industry peers. After that, for each industry and each particular year, the following OLS regression is run, except for the firm under consideration: Consistent with Daniel and Titman (2004) and Polk and Sapienza (2004) , the CSI measure is constructed as follows:
where ME : market value of the equity, equal to the end-of-period year share price times the number of shares outstanding and is log stock return from period t-3 to t.
C. Empirical Models
C.1. Basic Model I: Financial Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
Consistent with previous studies in the U.S., the following model is used to examine the impact of financial constraints on investment-cash flow sensitivity: and isolating the full investment-cash flow sensitivity (α CF ): In equation (3), the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a financially unconstrained firm is measured by the 'baseline' coefficient, α 1 , whereas the sensitivity of a constrained firm is measured by the summed coefficients: 12 Size is included to control for the differences in capital investment policies due to firms' size and maturity. Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) suggest that it is important to control for financial leverage because it is negatively related to investment. CashHoldings is added to control the effect of corporate liquidity on investment. Sales is added to control for the effect of changes in demand which is not captured by Q.
is included because working capital and capital investment are two major competing uses of funds (see Fazzari and Peterson, 1993) . Firm dummies are included to control for cross-sectional variation due to unobserved individual heterogeneity. Year dummies are added to control for time-series variation due to cyclical influences and unspecified time effects.
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C.2. Basic Model II: Mispricing and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
The impact of mispricing on investment-cash flow sensitivity is examined using the following empirical model, similar to equation (3) 
where : mispricing variable which captures the degree of mispricing of the firms' stock -the value of the variable is higher (lower) for overvalued (undervalued) firms. All variables utilized in this study are listed and defined in Table 1 .
In equation (9), the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a 'zero' mispriced firm is measured by the 'baseline' coefficient, α 1 , whereas the sensitivity of a mispriced firm is 
In equation (10) Since unconstrained firms have easier access to external capital markets, they can issue equity without difficulty at the overvalued price. However, the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection problems hamper the ability of financially constrained firms to raise external funds. Given the restricted access of constrained firms to external capital markets, they have less ability to raise external funds than unconstrained firms. In other words, financially unconstrained firms are more flexible to adjust their investment policies in response to mispricing. Accordingly, investment-cash flow sensitivities of constrained firms should be higher than that of unconstrained firms during the periods of overvaluation.
Based on this discussion and earlier argument, several hypotheses can be Table 2 presents the correlations between the variables used in the subsequent empirical analysis. All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Investment is positively correlated with CashFlow. This is consistent with the intuition that corporate investment is dependent on internal cash flow which implies the existence of financial constraints.
E. Summary Statistics
Investment is also found to be negatively correlated with CashHoldings which is consistent with the idea that investment and cash holdings are two major competing uses of funds. Table 3 displays correlations between different measures of financial constraints.
As mentioned above, the KZ and WW indexes are higher (lower) for financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. Constrained (Unconstrained) firms are usually small (large) and non-dividend paying (dividend paying) firms. Therefore, the KZ and WW indexes should be negatively correlated with the book value of total asset (BVTA) and the dividend payout ratio. However, only the WW index is negatively correlated with BVTA 14 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) include firms only if the data are available for the entire sample period. However, to avoid the introduction of survivorship bias to subsequent analysis, firms are only required to have at least ten consecutive years' data in order to remain in the sample. and the dividend payout ratio, and this occurs at the 1% significance level. In contrast, the KZ index is not statistically correlated with the dividend payout ratio and positively correlated with size (significant at 1% level). Thus, it seems that the KZ index is not a good measure of financial constraints. This suspicion is consistent with Almeida et al. (2004) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2005) who claim that the KZ index provides contradictory results to other financial constraint measures. Table 4 displays the summary statistics of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. According to dividend payout, book value of total assets and the WW index, constrained firms tend to make less new investment of 5.5% to 5.7% every year, have more cash holdings (14.6% to 17.5%) and less internal cash flow (3.1% to 6.5%). In addition, constrained firms are typically smaller in size (3.4 to 4.9). In contrast, unconstrained firms tend to make more new investment every year, have less cash holdings and more internal cash flow, and typically larger. Column 3 of Table 4 .3 presents the summary statistics of firms partitioned into constrained and unconstrained groups using the KZ index, constrained firms have higher level of investment than unconstrained firms, and they are of bigger size. It appears that the KZ index is unsuccessful in identifying constrained and unconstrained firms. Therefore, one should be cautious about interpreting subsequent results obtained by the KZ index. Again, other financial constraint measures appear to be successful in capturing the financial status of firms and consistent with each other. Table 5 reports the outcome of estimating Model I of equation (3). Column 1 presents results for firms partitioned using the dividend payout ratio as a proxy for financial constraints. Both coefficients α 1 and α ΔFC are statistically significant at 1% level. The investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially unconstrained (dividend-paying) firms is found to higher than that of constrained (non-dividend paying) firms, which are 0.082 and 0.013 (0.082-0.069), respectively. The former result indicates support for hypothesis H Ia .
IV.
Empirical Results
A. Model I: Financial Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
As discussed above, α ΔFC (= -0.069) measures the difference between the investment-cash flow sensitivity of constrained and unconstrained firms. Thus, hypothesis H Ib is supported.
This is consistent with the results of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999 Cleary ( , 2004 ) that investment-cash flow sensitivities of unconstrained firms are higher than that of constrained firms. The results, however, contrast the findings of Fazzari et al. (1988) . One possible explanation is the considerable difference in the samples as Fazzari et al. (1988) analyse only 422 US manufacturing firms over the 1970-1984 period.
Column 2 reports the regression results obtained by using book value of total assets (BVTA) as a proxy for financial constraints. Consistent with the results based on the dividend payout ratio as the financial constraint measure both hypotheses H Ia and H Ib are supported at 1% level. In particular, a negative coefficient of the interaction term (-0.087) suggesting that investment of financially unconstrained (large) firms are more sensitive to internal cash flow than that of constrained (small) firms.
Regression estimations of Model I using the KZ index are presented in Column 3 of Table 5 . Notably, the estimated coefficients on cash flow and on the interaction term are insignificant at the 5% level. This suggests that financial constraints have no impact on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. This supports the findings of Hovakimian and
Hovakimian (2005) that results based on the KZ index are inconsistent with those based on other financial constraint measures and thus that the KZ index is an unreliable proxy.
Column 4 reports the results from using the WW index as a proxy for financial constraints. Investment of financially unconstrained (low WW index score) firms are more sensitive to internal cash flow than that of constrained (high WW index score) firms (1% level). Again, both hypotheses H Ia and H Ib are supported.
Finally, a quick comment on the control variables. 15 Tobin Q has a positive and significant (at 1 % level) impact on investment. Most of the other control variables have the expected signs and statistically significant coefficients. The positive coefficients of Size suggest that larger firms tend to have higher levels of investment. Consistent with Lang et al. (1996) , Leverage is found to have a negative and significant effect on investment across all groupings. In addition, the positive coefficients of Sales indicate that it has a positive influence on investment.
Overall, the results from Model I (Equation (3)) appear to be consistent with the main findings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) , who document that investment of financially unconstrained firms are more sensitive to the availability of internal cash flow than that of constrained firms. Table 6 reports the outcome of estimating Model II of equation (9). Column 1 presents results using the composite share issuance (CSI) as the mispricing measure. The base case investment-cash flow sensitivity represents the "zero" mispricing estimate, and the significant positive result (0.031, at the 1% level) shows strong support for hypothesis H IIa . Moreover, based on the CSI analysis, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is found to decline as firms become more overvalued (-0.004, at the 1% level) -thus, hypothesis H IIb is supported. The counterpart result shown in Column 2 for discretionary accruals (DACCR) confirms this finding albeit coefficient α MP is not significant at conventional levels. In short, we see some support for the mispricing hypothesis. We now move on to consider what new insights can be obtained from the much richer framework that simultaneously accommodates and interacts the constraints and mispricing issues. Table 7 reports the regression results of Model III (Equation (10)). Columns 1-4 present the results using the dividend payout ratio, BVTA, the KZ index and the WW index, respectively, to separate firms into constrained and unconstrained categories. Several observations are worthy of note from this table.
B. Model II: Mispricing and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
C. Model III: Financial Constraints, Financial Flexibility and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
First, it is quite notable that the KZ index again fails to conform to the findings achieved by the alternative constraints proxies. None of the central coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. This reinforces the earlier suggestion that this measure is a poor proxy and should not be given any credence in the final conclusions.
Again this confirms the similar view coming from Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2005) .
Accordingly, we make no further reference to the KZ index results.
Second, there is an amazing conformity in results achieved across the other three financial constraints proxies. This is a very comforting outcome which increases our confidence in the veracity of the analysis based on these proxies. Accordingly, the remaining discussion does not bother distinguishing results between the dividend payout, BVTA and WW index cases (except to highlight a few illustrative findings).
Third, with regard to hypothesis H IIIa : α 1 > 0, we observe strong support for this "base case" prediction: with all coefficient estimates significant at the 1% level, it essentially confirms the earlier finding that financially unconstrained firms have a strong investment-cash flow sensitivity. Fourth, with regard to hypothesis H IIIb : α ΔFC < 0 (Financial Constraints hypothesis, zero MP) we also see strong support (at the 1% level).
Fifth, hypothesis H IIIc : α MP < 0 is likewise strongly consistent with the data -the Mispricing hypothesis, for firms that are not financially constrained finds good support (significant negative coefficients at the 5% level). This indicates that on average, investment undertaken by overvalued firms is less sensitive to the availability of internal cash flow. In contrast, undervalued firms tend to rely more on internal cash flow for investment. This is consistent with the intuition that overvalued firms tend to raise external funds and invest rather than utilize internal funds since external funds are much cheaper than internal funds.
Sixth, with regard to hypothesis H IIIe : α ΔFM > 0, the coefficient estimates are uniformly positive as predicted and, with the exception of one case (BVTA/CSI), are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the interaction FC/Mispricing -the financial flexibility hypothesis -is supported. Essentially, this indicates that the investment-cash flow sensitivity of overvalued financially constrained firms is higher than that of counterpart unconstrained firms. Given the restricted access of constrained firms to external markets, it is difficult for them to raise external funds, even if they are overvalued. Therefore, the investments of such constrained firms are more dependent on internal cash flow compared to similar unconstrained firms. In other words, financially constrained firms are financially less flexible in adjusting their sources of financing for investment in response to mispricing. In contrast, since unconstrained firms have easier access to external capital markets. Therefore, in a period of overvaluation, unconstrained firms can fund their investment by raising external funds without difficulty. Thus, financially unconstrained firms are financially more flexible to adjust their sources of financing for investment in order to react to mispricing. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) who document that macroeconomic conditions have less impact for issue choice for financially constrained firms.
V.
Robustness Checks
We conduct the following four tests to ensure our results are robust. First, to distinguish financial constraints from financial distress, we restrict our sample to include only firms with positive cash flows. Second, as suggested by Cleary et al. (2007) , conventional data selection criteria may systematically eliminate financially weaker firms which may defect the conclusiveness of the results. Accordingly, we relax the market capitalization and minimum data existence criteria to check whether our results are robust even without these conventional data restrictions. Third, to avoid the potential endogeneity issues, the control variables are restricted to include only Q and Sales (consistent with Cleary et al. (2007) . Fourth, the financial constraint measures are re-classified and our results are reestimated using median sort method. The overall outcome is consistent with our previous results.
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VI. Conclusion
This study examines the separate and joint impact of financial constraints and mispricing on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. The empirical analysis was performed on an extensive sample of US manufacturing firms, over the period 1971 to 2004.
Our main findings can readily be captured in three dimensions. First, financially unconstrained firms exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity compared to constrained firms. This result is consistent with the findings documented by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) , but contrasts the results of Fazzari et al. (1988) .
Second, the KZ index as a financial constraint measure, produces contradictory results compared to all other alternative proxies. This raises serious concerns regarding its 16 To conserve space, these robustness results are not reported but are available upon request.
reliability for this purpose and thus supports the arguments presented in Almeida et al. (2004) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2005) . Accordingly, future researchers should apply great caution when interpreting any results based on the KZ index.
Third, the joint impact of financial constraints and mispricing on the investmentcash flow sensitivity is especially insightful. Notably, several alternative classifications of financial constraints and mispricing lead to a strongly consistent result. Specifically, it seems that financially unconstrained firms are financially more flexible in adjusting their investment policies, compared to constrained firms, in response to mispricing. This finding is of great interest since it provides a plausible explanation for the empirical results documented by Bhandari (1988) , Chan and Chen (1991) , Fama and French (1992) ,
and Shumway (1996) that financially constrained firms tend to have lower value than unconstrained firms. The fundamental intuition is that financial flexibility facilitates cheaper funds for investment which adds value to financially unconstrained firms. 
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Change in accounts receivable CSI is the change in the difference between current assets and current liabilities scaled by lagged book value of total assets. CashFlow is net profit before depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged book value of total assets. Q is the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales is sales deflated by lagged book value of total assets. Correlations significant at 5% and 1% level are indicated by * and **, respectively. This table presents the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variables. In Columns 1 to 4, firms are partitioned into financially constrained and unconstrained categories according to the dividend payout ratio, book value of total assets (BVTA), the KZ index score and the WW index score, respectively. Based on each index score, firms in the top (bottom) two deciles are classified as high (low) which are taken to represent financially constrained (unconstrained) cases. Size is defined as the natural log of book value of total assets and firms in the top (bottom) two size deciles are classified as large (small). All other variable are defined as in Table 1 . FUC and FC are defined as financially unconstrained and constrained firms, respectively.
Investment
(1) (2) (3) Investment is capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets. CashFlow is net profit before depreciation and amortization scaled by lagged book value of total assets. FC is the financial constraint dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for constrained firms and 0 otherwise. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Size is defined as the natural log of book value of total assets. Leverage represents the ratio of total debt to total assets. CashHoldings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to lagged book value of total assets. Sales is sales deflated by lagged book value of total assets.
is the change in the difference between current assets and current liabilities scaled by lagged book value of total assets. The regression equation is estimated with fixed firm and year effects. The estimation corrects for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Coefficients significant at 5% and 1% level are indicated by * and ** respectively, t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Investment is capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets. CashFlow is net profit before depreciation and amortization scaled by lagged book value of total assets. MP is the mispricing variable which measures the level of stock mispricing. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Size is defined as the natural log of book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. CashHoldings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to lagged book value of total assets. Sales is sales deflated by lagged book value of total assets. NWC Δ is the change in the difference between current assets and current liabilities scaled by lagged book value of total assets. The regression equation is estimated with fixed firm and year effects. The estimation corrects for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Coefficient significant at 5% and 1% level are indicated by * and **, respectively, t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
(1) Investment is capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets. CashFlow is net profit before depreciation and amortization scaled by lagged book value of total assets. MP is the mispricing variable which measures the level of stock mispricing. FC is the financial constraint dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for constrained firms and 0 otherwise. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Size is defined as the natural log of book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. CashHoldings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to lagged book value of total assets. Sales is sales deflated by lagged book value of total assets.
is the change in the difference between current assets and current liabilities scaled by lagged book value of total assets. The regression equation is estimated with fixed firm and year effects. The estimation corrects for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Coefficient significant at 5% and 1% level are indicated by * and ** respectively, t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Investment is capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets. CashFlow is net profit before depreciation and amortization scaled by lagged book value of total assets. MP is the mispricing variable which measures the level of stock mispricing. FC is the financial constraint dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for constrained firms and 0 otherwise. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Size is defined as the natural log of book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. CashHoldings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to lagged book value of total assets. Sales is sales deflated by lagged book value of total assets. NWC Δ is the change in the difference between current assets and current liabilities scaled by lagged book value of total assets. The regression equation is estimated with fixed firm and year effects. The estimation corrects for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Tests relevant to the hypothesis H IIId : (α MP + α ΔFM ) < 0 are reported.
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